Evidence Admitted - DEFT'S EX A-40 FOR ID - CV OF DEFT'S MEDICAL EXPERT Due Date: Complete Date: September 28, 2021 (2024)

Case

MANUEL BACELO VS ERIEL MENEDEZ

Jul 25, 2024 |CA07 - Downtown Miami - Judge Trawick, Daryl E |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013971-CA-01

Case

ROBERTO RIQUELME VS RUBEN DARIO HELAGO ET AL

Jul 25, 2024 |CA08 - Downtown Miami - Judge Watson, Robert |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013945-CA-01

Case

ILSIS CALA HERRERA VS RENE BASULTO

Jul 22, 2024 |CA10 - Downtown Miami - Judge Lopez, Peter R |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013606-CA-01

Case

LINDA STEWART VS RIUTEL BEACH, INC.

Jul 25, 2024 |CA08 - Downtown Miami - Judge Watson, Robert |Comm Premises Liability |Comm Premises Liability |2024-013969-CA-01

Case

DOMINGO RAFO MARIMON VS JULIO FIGUEROA

Jul 23, 2024 |CA06 - Downtown Miami - Judge Johnson, Charles |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013755-CA-01

Case

ANDRES DOMINGUEZ VS ALEX JOSEPH MICHEL MOISE ET AL

Jul 24, 2024 |CA23 - Downtown Miami |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013830-CA-01

Case

EDWARD GIBBS VS CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC.

Jul 25, 2024 |CA25 - Downtown Miami - Judge Manno-Schurr, Valerie |Other Negligence |Other Negligence |2024-013926-CA-01

Case

STESSY MENEUS VS MICHAEL RYAN TORRES ET AL

Jul 24, 2024 |CA11 - Downtown Miami - Judge Eig, Spencer |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013806-CA-01

Case

EVA LIDIA SALAZAR VS COMFORT CARE TRANSPORTATION, LLC

Jul 22, 2024 |CA32 - Downtown Miami - Judge Fajardo Orshan, Ariana |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013592-CA-01

Ruling

Dent vs. Dent

Jul 23, 2024 |22EA-0200030

DENT VS. DENTCase Number: 22EA-0200030This matter is trailing the Dent Trust matter. (Case No. CVPV21-0031299). That matter is beingcontinued to September 30, 2024. Based on the foregoing, this matter is likewise continued to Monday,September 30, 2024, at 2:30 p.m. in Department 44 to trail the trust matter. No appearance isnecessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

LAM vs ROHR, INC.

Jul 24, 2024 |CVRI2305206

DEMURRER TO SECONDCVRI2305206 LAM VS ROHR, INC.AMENDED COMPLAINTTentative Ruling: Overrule as to causes of action one through five. Sustain as to the sixth causeof action without leave to amend. Sustain as to the seventh cause of action with 20 days’ leaveto amend.

Ruling

Daquan Jones vs. Hiller Aircraft Corporation

Jul 24, 2024 |18CECG04044

Re: Jones v. Hiller Aircraft Corp. Case No. 18CECG04044Hearing Date: July 24, 2024 (Dept. 403)Motion: Defendant City of Firebaugh’s Motion for Contribution If oral argument is timely requested, it will be entertained on Wednesday, July 31, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 403.Tentative Ruling: To grant defendant City of Firegbaugh’s motion for an order requiring defendantHiller Aircraft to contribute $4,307,349.06 to the City as payment of its pro rata share ofthe judgment.Explanation: Under Code of Civil Procedure section 875, subdivision (a), “[w]here a moneyjudgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action thereshall be a right of contribution among them as hereinafter provided.” “Such right ofcontribution shall be administered in accordance with the principles of equity.” (CodeCiv. Proc., § 875, subd. (b). “Such right of contribution may be enforced only after onetortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his prorata share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share of theperson so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contributionbeyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd.(c).) Here, the City of Firebaugh and Hiller Aircraft were held to be jointly liable forplaintiff’s damages after a jury trial. The City was found to be liable for 25% of plaintiff’stotal damages, Hiller was found to be 25% liable, and its employee Steven Palm wasfound to be 45% liable. The jury originally awarded total damages of $9,28,323.69 againstall defendants, but later the court reduced the amount to $8,593,907.51. (Exhibit A toWalls decl.) The City subsequently paid plaintiff $6,602,165.53 to satisfy the judgment.(Exhibit F to Walls decl.) Plaintiff then filed an acknowledgment of satisfaction ofjudgment as to the City. Therefore, the City has paid more than its pro rata share of thejudgment, and it is entitled to contribution from Hiller for the share owed by Hiller. Hiller argues that the City cannot recover any contribution here because the Citydismissed its cross-complaint before trial and admitted in open court that it had nopending cross-claims. However, where a defendant has dismissed its cross-complaintvoluntarily and without prejudice, it can still seek contribution from the other tortfeasorsbased on principles of equitable indemnity. (Cobb v. Southern Pac. Co. (1967) 251Cal.App.2d 929, 933–934.) Here the City voluntarily dismissed its cross-complaint againstHiller Aircraft without prejudice before trial. (See Request for Dismissal filed on October19, 2022.) Nevertheless, it still has the right to seek contribution under principles ofequitable indemnity, as set forth in section 875. (Code Civ. Proc., § 875; Cobb, supra, atp. 933-934.) Hiller also argues that the City’s motion is without merit because Hiller has enteredinto a settlement with plaintiff, and it has sought an order for determination that itssettlement is in good faith. Thus, Hiller contends that the City’s claim for indemnity orcontribution will be barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. However, the courthas already denied Hiller’s request to determine that the settlement with plaintiff was ingood faith under section 877.6. The court found that section 877.6 does not apply to thesettlement because the settlement was entered into after the verdict and judgmentwere entered in the case. (April 17, 2024 Order Adopting Tentative Ruling.) Therefore,the fact that Hiller entered into a settlement with plaintiff does not prevent the City fromseeking contribution from Hiller here. Hiller also claims that, if it is forced to pay the City for its pro rata share of thejudgment, it will be forced into bankruptcy as it has no insurance to cover the judgment,which would prevent plaintiff from recovering anything from it. It also denies that it has$30 million in assets with which to pay the judgment, as the City has asserted. It claimsthat it is struggling to even pay installments to plaintiff under the settlement. Hillercontends that it would not be equitable to force it into bankruptcy and deny recoveryto the plaintiff, so the court should deny the motion for contribution. However, Hiller has not presented any admissible evidence that it has no assetswith which to pay the judgment. The declaration of its attorney says nothing about Hiller’sactual assets or cash on hand. He only states that Hiller will file for bankruptcy, not that ithas no insurance, cash, or assets to pay the judgment. (Frankenberger decl., ¶ 21.) In any event, even assuming that Hiller is insolvent, its insolvency does not meanthat it cannot be ordered to pay contribution to the City of Firebaugh. As discussedabove, the City has paid more than its pro rata share of the judgment, so it ispresumptively entitled to contribution from Hiller as a co-debtor on the judgment. Hillershould not be “given a pass” on the judgment just because it allegedly does not havethe money to pay its share. Nor should the taxpayers of the City of Firebaugh be forcedto pay more than their share of the judgment simply because Hiller is allegedly insolvent.It would not be equitable to allow Hiller to escape its duty to pay its share of the judgmentthat was already paid off by the City. Finally, while Hiller has objected to the amount sought by the City as contribution,it has not explained which specific amounts are incorrect and what the total contributionamount should be. The City’s request for a contribution amount of $4,307,349.06 appearsto be correctly calculated, as it is consistent with Hiller’s 70% share of liability based onthe jury verdict. Therefore, the court intends to grant the City’s motion for an orderrequiring Hiller to pay contribution to the City in the amount of $4,307,349.06. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: JS on 7/23/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

VARGAS vs LOYA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

Jul 26, 2024 |CVRI2305674

Motion to Set Aside Default onVARGAS vs LOYA Complaint for Business Tort/UnfairCVRI2305674 CASUALTY INSURANCE Business Practice (Over $25,000) ofCOMPANY VANESSA VARGAS by LOYACASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANYTentative Ruling:The unopposed motion to set aside ethe default is granted.

Ruling

REBECCA CASTILLO VS BIG ALS LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Jul 25, 2024 |23PSCV03859

Case Number: 23PSCV03859 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 6 Plaintiff Rebecca Castillos Request for Entry of Default Judgment Defendant: Big Als LLC TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND This is an ADA/Unruh case. On December 13, 2023, plaintiff Rebecca Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Big Als LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging one cause of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On February 6, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $9,074.00, including $8,000.00 in damages, $570.00 in attorney fees, and $504.00 in costs. The Court finds Plaintiffs damage request is excessive. Plaintiff cites the case of Johnson v. Guedoir (E.D. Cal. 2016) 218 F.Supp.3d 1096 (Johnson) as the basis for requesting $4,000.00 in deterrence damages plus $4,000.00 for encountering the barriers, for a total demand of $8,000.00. (Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 5-6; Summary of the Case, 2:1-8.) Johnson does not support this outcome. The court in Johnson found $8,000.00 in statutory damages was warranted based on two incidents wherein the plaintiff was deterred on one date and then personally encountered the barriers on a different date. (Johnson, supra, 218 F.Supp.3d at p. 1100.) Here, Plaintiff states that she attempted to access Defendants goods and services on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff then confusingly states that she was deterred from visiting Defendants brick-and-mortar location in Ontario on November 2, 2023 and November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 14.) It is unclear how Plaintiff was deterred on November 2, 2023 before she visited the website on November 8, 2023. (See Castillo Decl., ¶¶ 5, 14, Ex. 1.) Additionally, Plaintiffs browsing history only shows her having attempted to visit Defendants website on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., Ex. 1.) At most, the Court finds evidence of one violation on November 8, 2023, which adds up to $4,000.00, not $8,000.00. The Court also finds that, based on the reduced damage calculation, Plaintiffs request for attorney fees must also be reduced. (Local Rule 3.214.) The Court finds the correct amount of attorney fees that Plaintiff can recover here is $330.00. Additionally, Plaintiff did not complete items 4, 5, or 6 of Judicial Council Form CIV-100. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585.5, 587; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6400 et seq.) CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

Ruling

The People of the State of California, Department of Transportation vs. Shepherd, Robert et al

Aug 05, 2024 |S-CV-0049197

S-CV-0049197 The People of the State of California, Department ofTransportation vs. Shepherd, Robert et al** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required.

Ruling

Julie Bulosan vs Kaylee Doe et al.

Jul 25, 2024 |21CV-00915

21CV-00915 Julie Bulosan v. Kaylee Doe, et al.Motion for Mandatory Relief Pursuant to CCP § 473(b)Counsel for Plaintiff Julie Ann Soriano Bulosan provides a declaration of fault due tocounsel’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excuseable neglect with respect to theDecember 22, 2023 Order that Plaintiff pay $920 in discovery sanctions and asserts thatsuch relief is mandatory under CCP § 473(b). Defendants assert (1) that CCP § 473(b) isinapplicable to discovery orders, (2) the motion is untimely as it was brought more thansix months from the date of the order, and (3) the affidavit of fault does not establishmistake, inadvertence, surprise or excuseable neglect.The motion for relief is DENIED. This Court agrees with Defendant that (1) that CCP §473(b) is inapplicable to discovery orders, and (2) the motion is untimely as it wasbrought more than six months from the date of the order. Furthermore, even if relief wasmandatory under CCP § 473(b) this court may grant relief under conditions as may bejust. There is no question that discovery responses were substantially delayed and thatseveral motions have been necessary for Defendants to obtain the discovery requestedor the sanctions awarded. If Plaintiff’s counsel believes that is client should not berequired to pay sanctions, then counsel has the option of paying the sanctions himselfas there has been no showing that the award of sanctions or the amount wasunreasonable or excessive, only that Plaintiff herself was not at fault. Thus the courtconcludes that while even if relief were granted, the conditions that would be just wouldrequire an order that Plaintiff’s counsel should pay the sanctions instead of Plaintiffherself.Motion for Enforcement of Monetary SanctionsThe Motion for Enforcement of Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED in Part. AdditionalSanctions in the amount of $500 are awarded against both Plaintiff and her counsel,jointly and severally. The request for additional monetary santions in excess of $500 iaDENIED.

Ruling

RIMA SHAFRAZIAN, ET AL. VS ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE, ET AL.

Jul 26, 2024 |23BBCV00532

Case Number: 23BBCV00532 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 26, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV00532 MP: Arsen Hovanesyan M.D. (Defendant) RP: Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (Co-Defendants) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Rima Shafrazian, Gevik Shafrazian, and Greta Shafrazian, individually and as successor in interest of the estate of Joseph Shafrazian (Decedent) (collectively Plaintiffs) bring this action against Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, WellRx, Inc. dba Wellness Lab, Jivan Melikian, M.D., Artin Aghakhani, R.PH., Karina Nazarian, Linda Nguyen, R.PH., Aram Manoukian, and Arsen Hovanesyan, M.D. (Hovanesyan) (collectively Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Defendants negligently failed to deliver Decedents prescriptions for a heart condition, ultimately resulting in his death. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Hovanesyan. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Hovanesyan for (1) Wrongful Death by Medical Negligence and (2) Survival Action. Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition; however, an opposition was filed by Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (hereinafter Co-Defendants). ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (C.C.P. § 437c(a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangsterv. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) II. MERITS Co-Defendants Opposition The Court notes that neither it, nor the parties, have located any California state court authority directly addressing whether a co-defendant can oppose another co-defendants motion for summary judgment. However, in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, the California Supreme Court held that "any adverse party" may oppose a summary judgment motion. A real party in interest has standing to prosecute an action, except as otherwise provided by statute. (C.C.P. §367.) A real party in interest must have an actual, substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. (County of Alameda v. State Board of Control (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103.) A person who has an actual interest in the subject matter of an action, and therefore a right to relief, has standing. (Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351.) A party to whom indemnity might be owed or who would owe indemnity is a real party in such an action. (Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes/All American Development Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 40.). However, that is not the case here. On May 16, 2023, Co-Defendants filed their Cross-Complaint stating causes of action for (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Contribution, and (3) Declaratory Relief. The adverse parties in Co-Defendants Cross-Complaint are the fictious entities/persons identified as Roes 1-50. A review of the Courts records reveals that Co-Defendants have never amended their Cross-Complaint to identify the parties unknown to them at the time of filing. Nor have Co-Defendants ever independently filed a Cross-Complaint against Hovanesyan. As such, it would appear to the Court that Co-Defendants lack standing to oppose this motion. In reaching this conclusion, in addition to Aguilar as noted above, the court finds the United States District Court case of Eckert v. City of Sacramento (E.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 3211278, helpful. In Eckert, the Court stated: Union Pacific raises a procedural question that has been infrequently addressed: [i]n the absence of cross-claims, may one co-defendant be the sole & opposition to another co-defendants motion for summary judgment? The Blonder Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that in the absence of a crossclaim, a co-defendant lacks standing to oppose his co-defendants motion for summary judgment. Under the rationale of Blonder, since there is no crossclaim between the Defendants, Union Pacific and the City are not adverse parties and the City therefore does not have standing to oppose Union Pacifics motion for summary judgment. The Citys arguments opposing Union Pacifics motion will therefore not be considered. (Id. at 3, citing to Blonder v. Casco Inn Residential Care, Inc. (D.Me. May 4, 2000) 2000 WL 761895, at *1 [internal citations omitted].) The Court finds the rationale set forth, and referred to in Eckert is persuasive. (See also Fraioli v. Lemcke, 328 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.R.I.2004) 263 n. 4 [[S]ince none of the defendants in this case have filed cross claims against each other, the defendants are not adverse parties who are entitled to object to each others motions for summary judgment.]; Dixon v. County of Alameda (N.D.Cal. Apr.18, 1997) 1997 WL 220311, at *6 n. 8 [noting that co-defendant did not have standing to oppose co-defendants motion for summary judgment]; C.F. Bean Corp. v. Clayton Indus. Ltd. (E.D.La. Aug.19, 1996) 1996 WL 470644, at *1 [same].) Further, that language of C.C.P. § 437c indicates there is no standing for a co-defendant to oppose a motion for summary judgment that does not seek relief against it. (See C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2) [If the defendant meets its burden to show that a cause of action has no merit by showing that an element of the cause of action cannot be established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.].) Request for a Continuance Although the Court finds that the Co-Defendants do not have standing, it will further note that a request for continuance is denied for the reasons stated in Hovanesyans Repy to Co-Defendants Opposition. Facts In order to determine whether Hovanesyan has produced unrefuted evidence that he adhered to the standard of care, the Court finds it useful to provide a brief summary of the general facts of the case. On February 2, 2022, Decedent presented to his cardiologist, Hovanesyan, for a history and physical. (Exh. G. pp. 1997.) Decedents history and physical revealed that he suffered from a small to medium anterior perfusion defect consistent with ischemia. (Id.) On March 1, 2022, Decedent presented to Adventist Health Glendale wherein Hovanesyan performed a coronary angiography. (Id. at pp. 1982-1987.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs claims for medical negligence against Hovanesyan are purely in reference to his alleged failure to ensure Decedents receipt of the medication Plavix. Plaintiff makes no allegations as to whether Hovanesyan negligently performed the coronary angiography. (See FAC ¶ 24 [Defendants Dr. Hovanesyan and Dr. Melikian and DOES 1 through 10 were responsible for prescribing the Clopidogrel/Plavix, following up, and making sure that Mr. Shafrazian was taking Clopidogrel/Plavix after his procedure.].) Hovanesyans post-procedure Progress Notes for Decedent show that Dr. Melikian prescribed Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin on March 1, 2022 on an inpatient basis. (See Exh. G, p. 1989-1993 & 2090.) Decedents records also indicate that, on March 2, 2022 at 9:41 a.m., Hovanesyan ordered outpatient prescriptions for Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin. (Id. at 2091.) These prescriptions appear to have been ordered to Burbank Tower Pharmacy. (Id.) Further, the discharge paperwork issued to and signed by Decedent included a Home Medications list which instructed Decedent to take a daily dose of Plavix. (Id. at 2045, 2067.) Records reflect that on March 2, 2022 at 9:42 a.m., Burbank Tower Pharmacy received Hovanesyans prescription order. (Aghakhani Depo. p. 89, ¶¶ 19-25; Abramian Depo. p. 73, ¶¶ 8-25; Koroglu Depo. p., 53, ¶¶ 2-5.) Though the parties disagree as to why, it is clear that the Plavix and Aspirin prescriptions were placed on hold by Burbank Tower Pharmacy. Hovanesyan is of the opinion that the medications were placed on hold as the result of Decedents not having been given the medication. (See Aghakhani Depo. p. 26, ¶¶ 8-15 [She told me the patient never picked up the medication&thats why they put it on hold.].) On March 14, 2022, Decedent suffered a heart attack and died. (Exh. I.) An autopsy report revealed that Decedents cause of death was a myocardial infarction in the left ventricular free wall. (Exh. J.) Medical Negligence As concerns the action for Medical Negligence, Hovanesyan argues that summary judgment must be granted because there is no triable issue of fact as to whether his actions adhered to the standard of care in treating Decedent. The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage. (Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1571.) The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony. (Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601.) When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984985 [citations omitted].) Hovanesyan submits the declaration of Michael L. Chaikin, M.D. (Chaikin), in support of his motion. Chaikin states that he is a board-certified cardiologist and has been practicing cardiology since 1980. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 2.) Chaikin bases his declaration on his review of Decedents medical records as well as the depositions of Greta Shafrazian, Givek Shafrazian, Rima Shafrazian, Artin Aghakhani, Linda Nguyen, Sarineh Abramian, and Yolanda Siraki. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 5.) Chaikin states that, in his medical opinion, Hovanesyan appropriately documented that Decedent was receiving Plavix on an inpatient basis after the procedure. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 9.) Chaikin further states that Hovanesyans ordering of Plavix to Burbank Tower Pharmacy was within the standard of care. (Id.) Chaikin states that the records for Burbank Tower Pharmacy indicate they received the prescription order on March 2, 2022. (Id.) Chaikin states that, from the review of the deposition testimony in this matter, it is unclear why the Plavix prescription was placed on hold. (Id.) Regardless, Chaikin states that, from his review of the records and testimony, it is clear that Hovanesyan did not place any prescriptions on hold. (Id.) Chaikin concludes that, in his medical opinion, no act or omission of Hovanesyan caused or contributed to Decedents passing. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 10.) The Court is satisfied from the testimony of Chaikin that Hovanesyans actions were within the applicable standard of care. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have produced no expert testimony in contravention of Chaikins statements. It follows that Hovanesyan has demonstrated by unrefuted evidence that no triable issue of fact exists as to his breach of the standard of care in prescribing Plavix to Decedent. The holding in Munro makes abundantly clear that summary judgment must therefore be granted in favor of Hovanesyan. Survival Action A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedents successor in interest, subject to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate Code, and an action may be commenced by the decedents personal representative or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. (C.C.P. § 377.30.) A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedents cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedents personal representative or successor in interest. (San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1553.) Here the Court finds Plaintiffs survival action must also fail as they are unable to establish any triable issues of material fact regarding the breach element of the wrongful death cause of action above. Conclusion Hovanesyan has adequately demonstrated that his behavior was within the standard of care by virtue of his experts testimony. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to the contrary and a non-opposition was filed. As Plaintiffs survival action assumes the medical negligence of Hovanesyan, it too presents no triable issue of fact. Co-Defendants do not have standing to contest the summary judgment and have not justified a continuance. Accordingly, Hovanesyans unopposed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. --- RULING: In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Arsen Hovanesyan M.D.s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on June 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, HOVANESYAN TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

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ITZCOATL SUAREZ VS CITY OF DORAL ET AL

May 29, 2020 |CA27 - Downtown Miami - Judge Thomas, William |Comm Premises Liability |Comm Premises Liability |2020-011429-CA-01

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Jul 22, 2024 |CA06 - Downtown Miami - Judge Johnson, Charles |Comm Premises Liability |Comm Premises Liability |2024-013604-CA-01

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ASIEL ALFARO VS CITY OF SOUTH MIAMI

Jul 23, 2024 |CA15 - Downtown Miami - Judge Rodriguez, Jose M |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013748-CA-01

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ADNAN DIAZ JOMOLCA ET AL VS ATLANTIC MARINE INC.

Nov 05, 2021 |CA22 - Downtown Miami - Judge Butchko, Beatrice A |Other Negligence |Other Negligence |2021-024667-CA-01

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AYDEE TORRES VS PADRINO'S RESTAURANTS, INC.

Jul 25, 2024 |CA08 - Downtown Miami - Judge Watson, Robert |Comm Premises Liability |Comm Premises Liability |2024-013882-CA-01

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AZATE, NELLY VS FRANCO, MANUEL A MD

Jun 04, 2013 |Medical Malpractice |Medical Malpractice |2013-019743-CA-01

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RUBEN DE LA TORRE VALLEJO VS ELIA M AGUIRRE ET AL

Jul 26, 2024 |CA05 - Downtown Miami - Judge Del Rio, Vivianne |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-014004-CA-01

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FRENTZ LOUIS ET AL VS MARIANA BETHAN ET AL

Jul 25, 2024 |CA27 - Downtown Miami - Judge Thomas, William |Auto Negligence |Auto Negligence |2024-013944-CA-01